There is a recurring pattern in security, and despite it having low material value, it is gaining in momentum. This isn't the latest threat vector, but simple FUD.
A concept emerges that could be technically plausible. Because it is easy to explain, it spreads quickly. Almost like a disease.
"Juice jacking" is a current example.
Public USB ports framed as a credible data exfiltration vector. Advisory notices circulate. Organisations repeat the guidance internally. It is presented with the same tone as threats that routinely cause material harm.
It has all the characteristics of a serious issue, but lacks one critical element.
Evidence.
There is no meaningful body of real-world incidents demonstrating widespread exploitation. No consistent pattern of compromise. No regulatory or audit findings driven by it.
Yet it continues to occupy attention. Why?
Where security starts to drift
This is not about whether something is theoretically possible.
Many things are.
The issue is what happens when possibility is treated as priority.
- Security begins to drift from engineering discipline into narrative.
- Risk becomes something that is described rather than managed.
Low-probability scenarios are elevated because they are accessible. They are easy to communicate. They do not require structural change or executive ownership.
- They fill awareness programmes.
- They create visible activity.
- They avoid difficult questions.
Meanwhile, the conditions that actually lead to compromise remain in place.
- Identity controls are incomplete.
- Privileged access is not tightly governed.
- Attack paths are known but not disrupted.
- Recovery capability is assumed rather than proven.
These are not hypothetical risks - they are repeatedly observed failure points.
The cost is not noise. It is misallocation
Time and attention are finite.
When they are directed towards scenarios with no credible impact history, they are diverted from areas that consistently fail under scrutiny.
This is not neutral. It creates a false sense of coverage, and suggests risk is being managed when it is being described.
From a governance perspective, this matters.
Boards, regulators, and clients are not interested in theoretical completeness. They expect defensible decisions.
That requires prioritisation based on:
- Demonstrable likelihood
- Observable impact
- Clear ownership
FUD operates outside of that model.
Why it persists
FUD is not purely accidental.
It allows organisations to demonstrate engagement without addressing structural issues, provides content for awareness initiatives that appears serious without creating accountability, and avoids the need to define who owns risk and who is accountable when decisions create exposure.
You can issue guidance on avoiding public USB ports, track completion of that guidance, and then report it as progress.
None of this requires a change in how risk is owned or managed, and that is the attraction.
A practical test
There is a straightforward way to assess whether something belongs on your risk agenda.
Would it withstand scrutiny in a formal setting?
- Can you evidence real incidents at scale?
- Can you quantify the exposure in your environment?
- Can you demonstrate material impact to the business?
If the answer to these questions is no, it should not be competing for attention with known, repeatable failure modes.
This does not mean the scenario is impossible. It means it is not a priority.
What this exposes
Organisations rarely fail because they overlooked an obscure attack vector.
They fail because:
- Risk ownership is unclear.
- Decision authority is fragmented.
- Exposure accumulates without challenge.
When scrutiny arrives, these gaps are visible immediately.
At that point, the issue is not a missed control, but a lack of defined accountability.
The leadership implication
Security is not the pursuit of every conceivable threat.
It is the discipline of making defensible decisions about which risks are actively managed, which are accepted, and who is accountable for the outcome.
That requires clarity.
- Clarity on ownership.
- Clarity on exposure.
- Clarity on consequence.
FUD undermines that by shifting attention away from decisions that carry real weight.
Stop the FUD
If your organisation's security posture is materially influenced by whether someone uses a public USB charging port, the problem is not the charging port.
It is the absence of structural control.
Focus on what consistently causes harm.
- Define ownership.
- Challenge assumptions.
- Test recovery.
Everything else is just noise.
